Mutualism provides a compelling account of the fairness intuitions on display in economic games. However, it's not yet clear how well the approach holds up as an explanation of all human morality. The theory needs to be tested outside the methodological neighborhood it was born in; such testing has the potential to greatly improve our understanding of morality in general.
Many parsimonious theories of human morality never get to leave their birthplace. Born out of a particular set of observations in a particular methodological context (e.g., justice dilemmas, trolley problems), the theories are developed to explain a particular type of judgment or behavior, then expanded and offered as the explanation for why humans are not just selfish utility-maximizers -but then tested in the exact same methodological context they came from. This is the pattern followed by the target article's mutualistic approach to morality, born and tested in economic games. As the authors acknowledge, economic games lack ecological validity with regard to most instances of everyday moral judgments, intuitions, and behaviors (sect. 3.5, para. 2), and human morality (or the "moral sense") may encompass more than just these fairness intuitions (sect. 4, para. 4). Nevertheless, predictions of the theory are tested in the very limited realm of three economic games based on anonymous interactions between strangers. This is a good first step; the theory's predictions should now be tested in other domains, using other methods, to determine how well mutualism can explain the moral sense in all its instances.
In this commentary I propose three moral phenomena that the mutualistic approach could help explain: disgust, individual differences in moral judgment, and gossip.
It is possible that testing the mutualistic approach in a wider variety of moral situations would reveal areas where predictions either lack support or simply don't derive. For instance, the theory seems to have little to say about why incidental disgust can increase the severity of moral judgments (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008) . However, although the authors suggest that purity intuitions may be evolutionarily distinct from fairness intuitions (sect. 2.2.1, para. 11), it could be beneficial to examine whether mutualism could inform this puzzle. Perhaps disgust acts as a cue -for some people, in some situations -of partner untrustworthiness. This is anecdotally supported by participants hypnotically primed with disgust saying "It just seems like he's up to something" in response to an innocuous story (Wheatley & Haidt, 2005) .
Why is disgust treated as morally relevant to partner choice for some people, but not others? Individual differences in moral concerns and judgments have been shown across gender, culture, and political ideology (Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2011) . At first blush this is another phenomenon the mutualistic approach seems unlikely to illuminate, but it is worth pushing the theory to see how far it can go, beyond economic games and beyond judgments strictly about fairness. Perhaps moral intuitions are moderated by the qualities of the surrounding social structures, and group-focused moral concerns (about group loyalty, respect for traditions, and maintaining purity) are more relevant to partner choice decisions in "tight" cultures relative to "loose" cultures (Gelfand et al., 2011) . This would suggest that rather than one single evolved moral intuition, what has been selected for is a flexibility in moral responsiveness across situational and cultural contexts (see e.g. Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Wood & Eagly, in press ).
The authors posit that "humans are all equipped with the same sense of fairness" (sect.
3.1.2, para. 10) and suggest that if enough information were presented so that the situation were construed the same way, then this universal sense would lead to similar decisions for all people (see also Baumard & Sperber, 2010 ). This could be tested in the context of political arguments in which concerns about procedural and distributive justice (or micro-and macrojustice; Brickman, Folger, Goode, & Schul, 1981) conflict, as in issues like affirmative action where both sides are arguing based on different notions of fairness. The mutualistic approach seems to predict that if enough information was presented and situations were construed the same way, political opponents would see eye to eye. This is an empirical question in need of an answer.
Finally, the authors recognize the importance of reputation and gossip in social selection, yet treat this as a selection "for a disposition to be fair rather than for a disposition to sacrifice oneself or for virtues such as purity or piety that are orthogonal to one's value as a partner in most cooperative ventures" (sect. 2.2.1, para. 11). However, evidence shows that moral gossip is not relegated to fairness, but to a wider variety of virtues and vices, including how good a cooperator the person is, but also how good a family/group/congregation member they are, how well they adhere to moral and cultural norms, and whether they have the "right" upbringing, beliefs, and personality characteristics (Baumeister, Zhang, & Vohs, 2004; Wert & Salovey, 2004 Like disgust and individual differences, gossip is a fertile topic for which the mutualistic approach can provide novel predictions and explanations.
In conclusion, the authors have provided a commendable and convincing case for mutually beneficial cooperation as the distal mechanism for the fairness sense seen in economic games. But the mutualistic approach may have far greater benefits to moral psychology than explaining this particular set of behaviors.
